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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
STAPLETON, Circuit Judge: 
 
This appeal presents us with a narrow question of 
statutory interpretation. Section 365 of Title 11 requires 
that a bankruptcy trustee fulfill all the obligations that 
arise under a non-residential lease subsequent to the entry 
of the bankruptcy order and prior to the time that the lease 
is rejected. Under the terms of the non-residential lease 
entered by the debtor in this case, it was required to 
reimburse the landlord for all tax expenses attributable to 
the leased premises. The obligation to pay that 
reimbursement did not mature under the terms of the lease 
until after the order, although the landlord's liability for the 
taxes accrued in large part prior to the order. We must 
determine whether in these circumstances section 365 
requires the bankruptcy trustee to make the entire 




On September 7, 1995, Montgomery Ward Holding 
Corporation ("Montgomery Ward"), executed a lease on a 
commercial property in Illinois owned by CenterPoint 
Properties Trust ("CenterPoint"). Two of the provisions of 
the lease require Montgomery Ward to reimburse 
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CenterPoint for real estate taxes assessed on the premises. 
Section 6.1 of the lease states: 
 
       Upon receipt of an invoice from [CenterPoint], 
       [Montgomery Ward] further agrees to pay before any 
       fine, penalty, or interest or cost may be added thereto 
       for the nonpayment thereof, as Additional Rent for the 
       Premises, all Taxes . . . levied, assessed or imposed 
       upon the Premises or any part thereof accruing during 
       the Term of this Lease, notwithstanding that such 
       Taxes may not be due and payable until after the 
       expiration of the Term of this Lease. . . . 
 
An additional term of the Lease found in Section 6.3, 
provides for a "security deposit" mechanism which operates 
as follows: 
 
       As security for [Montgomery Ward's] obligation to pay 
       for Taxes assessed for 1996 and 1997, unless the same 
       were otherwise paid by [Montgomery Ward] prior to the 
       expiration of the Term, [Montgomery Ward] agrees to 
       deposit with [CenterPoint], or such other entity as 
       [CenterPoint] may designate, no later than thirty (30) 
       days prior to the expiration of the Term an amount 
       equal to one hundred percent (100%) of the most 
       recent ascertainable Taxes. . . . [Montgomery Ward's] 
       payment of the deposit shall be credited against the 
       Taxes due. . . . 
 
Thus, two separate lease provisions obligate Montgomery 
Ward to reimburse CenterPoint for tax liabilities incurred 
during the term of the lease. 
 
On July 7, 1997, Montgomery Ward filed for bankruptcy 
under Chapter 11. Montgomery Ward continued to make 
use of the premises as a debtor-in-possession pursuant to 
SS 1107 and 1108 of the Bankruptcy Code, but it neither 
assumed nor rejected the lease prior to the lease's 
expiration on September 1, 1997. 
 
On July 11, 1997, CenterPoint sent three invoices to 
Montgomery Ward. The first invoice was for a first 
installment of 1996 taxes (payable in 1997) in the amount 
of $320,404.40. The second invoice was for an estimated 
second installment of 1996 taxes in the amount of 
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$320,569.70. The third invoice was issued pursuant to 
Section 6.3 of the lease and covered the 1997 taxes. This 
was in the amount of $426,729.87. 
 
Montgomery Ward did not remit payment for either of the 
first two invoices, but remitted $96,584.95 as payment for 
the third invoice. This amount represented the prorated 
portion of taxes attributable to the period subsequent to 
Montgomery Ward's petition for bankruptcy relief. 
Montgomery Ward took the position that all taxes 
attributable to a pre-petition period constituted unsecured 
claims.1 
 
On September 15, 1997, CenterPoint filed a motion 
pursuant to 11 U.S.C. S 365(d)(3) in the Bankruptcy Court 
for the District of Delaware seeking payment in full of 
Montgomery Ward's tax reimbursement obligations 
pursuant to the lease. Section 365(d)(3) reads, in relevant 
part: 
 
       The trustee shall timely perform all the obligations of 
       the debtor, except those specified in section 365(b)(2), 
       arising from and after the order for relief under any 
       unexpired lease of nonresidential real property, until 
       such lease is assumed or rejected, notwithstanding 
       section 503(b)(1) of this title. The court may extend, for 
       cause, the time for performance of any such obligation 
       that arises within 60 days after the date of the order 
       for relief, but the time for performance shall not be 
       extended beyond such 60-day period. 
 
CenterPoint argued that all the invoices were payable 
immediately as "obligations of [Montgomery Ward] . . . 
arising from . . . the lease" after the order for relief.2 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. As the Seventh Circuit noted in In re Handy Andy Home Improvement 
Centers, 144 F.3d 1125, 1126 (7th Cir. 1998), recorded decisions often 
refer to "pre-petition" and "post-petition" periods rather than a "pre- 
order" and "post-order" periods. The latter terms are technically correct. 
 
2. While section 6.3 did not explicitly contemplate an invoice to trigger 
payment, it did contemplate that the payment obligation would arise at 
a fixed date no later than thirty days prior to the expiration of the 
lease. 
In the absence of an invoice from CenterPoint, the obligation to make 
payment would have arisen within the post-order, pre-rejection period. 
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Montgomery Ward argued that the statute was ambiguous 
and that the jurisprudence of the Third Circuit required 
that it should pay only the taxes attributable to the period 
after the order. 
 
The Bankruptcy Court decided in favor of Montgomery 
Ward. CenterPoint appealed this decision to the District 
Court for the District of Delaware, which affirmed the 
decision of the Bankruptcy Court. CenterPoint again 
appeals. 
 
The Bankruptcy Court had subject matter jurisdiction 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. S 157 because CenterPoint's claim 
arose in the Chapter 11 bankruptcy case filed by 
Montgomery Ward. The District Court had appellate 
jurisdiction over the Bankruptcy Court's final judgment, 
order, and decree pursuant to 28 U.S.C. SS 158(a) and 
1334(a). This Court has appellate jurisdiction to review the 
final order of the District Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 
SS 158(d) and 1291. We exercise plenary review over the 
legal question of the proper interpretation of a statute. In re 




Section 365(d)(3) mandates that "the trustee shall timely 
perform all the obligations of the debtor . . . arising from 
and after the order for relief under any unexpired lease 
. . . , until such lease is assumed or rejected, 
notwithstanding section 503(b)(1) of this title." 11 U.S.C. 
S 365(d)(3). There is, of course, a syntactical ambiguity in 
this text. It is not clear, as a purely formal matter, whether 
the preposition "from" should be read to modify the most 
proximate noun, "order," or the more remote,"lease." 
Nevertheless, we will interpret the preposition, as do both 
parties here, as modifying "lease," and the requirement as 
relating to obligations "arising from[,] and after the order of 
relief under[,] any unexpired lease." To require a trustee to 
perform all obligations "arising from . . . the order of relief " 
would make little sense and would be entirely inconsistent 
with the legislative history. 
 
The issue for resolution then is what Congress meant 
when it referred to "obligations of the debtor arising under 
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a lease after the order of relief." In the factual context of 
this case, does it require payment by the trustee of all 
amounts that first become due and enforceable after the 
order under the terms of the lease? Or does it require the 
proration of such amounts based upon whether the 
landlord's obligation to pay the taxes accrued before or 
after the order? 
 
We believe that to state these questions is to answer 
them. The clear and express intent of S 365(d)(3) is to 
require the trustee to perform the lease in accordance with 
its terms. To be consistent with this intent, any 
interpretation must look to the terms of the lease to 
determine both the nature of the "obligation" and when it 
"arises." If one accepts this premise, it is difficult to find a 
textual basis for a proration approach. On the other hand, 
an approach which calls for the trustee to perform 
obligations as they become due under the terms of the 
lease fits comfortably with the statutory text. 
 
The term "obligation" is not defined in the Code, and it is 
thus apparently used in its commonly understood sense. 
Black's Law Dictionary defines it as "[t]hat which a person 
is bound to do or forebear; any duty imposed by law, 
promise, contract, relations of society, courtesy, kindness, 
etc." Black's Law Dictionary 968-69 (5th ed. 1979). In the 
context of a lease contract, it seems to us that the most 
straightforward understanding of an obligation is something 
that one is legally required to perform under the terms of 
the lease and that such an obligation arises when one 
becomes legally obligated to perform. 
 
While Montgomery Ward insists that the statutory text is 
ambiguous, it has not advanced a plausible reading that 
seems to us consistent with that text. Several courts that 
have adopted a proration approach have suggested that 
such an approach can be reconciled with the text by 
interpreting "obligation" in light of the statutorily 
defined term "claim." See, e.g., Child World, Inc. v. 
Campbell/Massachusetts Trust (In re Child World, Inc.), 161 
B.R. 571, 574 (S.D.N.Y. 1993). The tenant has an 
"obligation" when the landlord has a "claim." The Code, of 
course, defines "claim" as including an "unmatured right to 
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payment."3 Thus, it is suggested, an "obligation" can arise 
before the tenant is obliged to perform. There are several 
difficulties with this suggestion. First, of course, Congress 
chose "obligation" and not "claim." See In re R.H. Macy & 
Co., 152 B.R. 869, 873 n.3 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (suggesting that 
this makes S 365(d)(3) "somewhat out of synch" with the 
rest of the code). Second, this reading would render 
S 365(d)(3) superfluous. Unmatured rights to payment 
under a lease exist from the date the lease is executed, and 
no right to payment would ever arise under an unexpired 
lease after the order for relief. Finally, understanding 
"obligation" to be the corollary of "claim" does not produce 
the result for which those making the suggestion contend. 
Including unmatured rights to payment provides no 
analytical foundation for prorating the obligation to 
reimburse the landlord for taxes based on the date of the 
order and whether the landlord's obligation to pay those 
taxes accrued before or after the order was entered, an 
obligation that clearly does not arise under the lease. 
Indeed, any reading that provided an analytical foundation 
for such proration would be inconsistent with what would 
appear to be the fundamental tenet of the text -- that it is 
the terms of the lease that determine the obligation and 
when it arose. 
 
Finding a straightforward interpretation that produces a 
rational result and no other reasonable interpretation 
consistent with the text, we are constrained to hold that 
S 365(d)(3) is not ambiguous. We thus have no justification 
for consulting legislative history. Nevertheless, we believe 
the limited legislative history of S 365(d)(3) is consistent 
with our reading of the text. The situation existing prior to 
the adoption of S 365(d)(3) has been accurately described in 
the literature as follows: 
 
       Prior to 1984, landlords who leased premises to a 
       [debtor-in-possession ("DIP")] sought payment of rent 
       and other postpetition charges as administrative 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. "Claim" is defined as a "right to payment, whether or not such right 
is reduced to judgment, liquidated, unliquidated, fixed, contingent, 
matured, unmatured, disputed, undisputed, legal, equitable, secured, or 
unsecured." 11 U.S.C. S 101(5)(A). 
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       expenses. Several factors, however, made collecting 
       postpetition lease obligations under S 503 an 
       unsatisfactory arrangement. First, a landlord had to 
       comply with the formal and time-consuming procedure 
       of an application, notice, and hearing. Second, a 
       landlord could, upon proper proof, only recover the 
       reasonable value of the DIP's actual use and occupancy 
       of the premises. The "reasonable value-actual use" 
       standard meant that (i) if a DIP physically occupied 
       only a portion of the premises, it would, in turn, only 
       be liable for the pro rata rent corresponding to the 
       percentage of space actually occupied, and (ii) the 
       court could limit a landlord's recovery to a fair market 
       rate where the contract rate in the lease appeared 
       clearly unreasonable. Finally, since bankruptcy courts 
       exercise discretion with respect to the timing of the 
       payment of administrative expenses, the court could 
       delay payment of the amount awarded to the landlord 
       until confirmation of a plan. The resulting loss of 
       income imposed a heavy economic burden on landlords 
       who were forced to provide ongoing services and space 
       to the estate without receiving timely payment to 
       satisfy their own cash obligations. 
 
See Joshua Fruchter, To Bind or Not to Bind -- Bankruptcy 
Code S 365(d)(3): Statutory Minefield, 68 Am. Bankr. L.J. 
437, 437 (1994) (emphasis in original; footnotes omitted) 
[herinafter "To Bind or Not to Bind"]. 
 
In 1984, Congress adopted S 365(d)(3) as a part of the 
Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgship Act of 
1984. Virtually all courts have agreed that it was intended 
to alleviate the above described burdens of landlords by 
requiring timely compliance with the terms of the lease. As 
Senator Orrin Hatch, a conferee on the originating act, put 
it: 
 
       This subtitle contains three major substantive 
       provisions which are intended to remedy serious 
       problems caused shopping centers and their solvent 
       tenants by the administration of the bankruptcy code. 
       . . . A second and related problem is that during the 
       time the debtor has vacated space but has not yet 
       decided whether to assume or reject the lease, the 
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       trustee has stopped making payments under the lease. 
       In this situation, the landlord is forced to provide current 
       services -- the use of its property, utilities, security, and 
       other services -- without current payment. No other 
       creditor is put in this position. In addition, the other 
       tenants often must increase their common area charge 
       payments to compensate for the trustee's failure to 
       make the required payments for the debtor. The bill 
       would lessen these problems by requiring the trustee to 
       perform all the obligations of the debtor under a lease of 
       nonresidential real property at the time required in the 
       lease. This timely performance requirement will insure 
       that debtor-tenants pay their rent, common area, and 
       other charges on time pending the trustee's assumption 
       or rejection of the lease. 
 
H.R. Rep. No. 882, 95th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1984 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 576 (emphasis added). Senator Hatch's 
statements seem to us to confirm that Congress intended 
that the debtor in possession perform "all the obligations 
. . . at the time required in the lease." See In re Krystal Co., 
194 B.R. 161, 164 (E.D. Tenn. 1996) (finding legislative 
history supports "time required in the lease" theory).4 
 
We are not alone in holding that an obligation arises 
under a lease for the purposes of S 365(d)(3) when the 
legally enforceable duty to perform arises under that lease. 
See e.g., In re Koenig Sporting Goods, Inc., 203 F.3d 986 
(6th Cir. 2000) (where rent for the coming month was due 
under the lease on the first of the month and the tenant 
rejected the lease on the second, "S 365(d)(3) is 
unambiguous as to the debtor's rent obligation and 
requires payment of the full month's rent;" proration would 
be inconsistent with the statute); In re R.H. Macy, 152 B.R. 
at 873 ("As [the landlord] correctly notes,[the debtor] is not 
directly liable for the reassessed taxes, but only 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. In re Child World, 161 B.R. 571, 575-77 (S.D.N.Y. 1993), and a line of 
similar cases focus on Senator Hatch's "current payment" for "current 
services" language and conclude that S 365(d)(3) was targeted at the 
specific inequity of requiring the landlord to provide current services 
without compensation. Senator Hatch's description of the solution 
chosen by Congress is not so limited, however. 
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contractually obligated to pay such amounts to [the 
landlord.] Accordingly, the reassessed taxes represent an 
obligation of [the debtor] under the Lease that arose after 
the order for relief which must be timely performed in 
accordance with section 365(d)(3)."); In re Duckwall-Alco 
Stores, 150 B.R. 965, 976 n.23 (D. Kan. 1993) (stating that 
"[t]he language of S 365(d)(3) is clear in imposing the duty 
to comply with all lease obligations arising after the order 
for relief. . . . The lease did not provide for payment of taxes 
to the landlord as they accrued."). See also  Joshua 
Fruchter, To Bind or Not to Bind -- Bankruptcy Code 
S 365(d)(3): Statutory Minefield, 68 Am. Bankr. L.J. 437, 
473 (1994). 
 
We reach the conclusion that S 365(d)(3) is unambiguous 
with some reluctance given that one sister court of appeals 
and a number of other courts have reached the opposite 
conclusion and have opted for a proration approach. See, 
e.g., In re Handy Andy, 144 F.3d 1125 (7th Cir. 1998); In 
re Child World, 161 B.R. 571 (S.D.N.Y. 1993), reversing 150 
B.R. 328 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1993). Nevertheless, we find 
ourselves unpersuaded by the contentions that have led 
them to their conclusion. We acknowledge that there are 
aspects to a proration approach that Congress might have 
found desirable. It is not our role, however, to make 
arguably better laws than those fashioned by Congress. See 
Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 578 (1979). 
We also acknowledge that proration was the pre-Code 
practice and that we had been admonished not to"read the 
Bankruptcy Code to erode past bankruptcy practice absent 
a clear indication that Congress intended such a 
departure." Pennsylvania Dept. Pub. Welfare v. Davenport, 
495 U.S. 552, 563 (1990). It seems clear to us, however, 
that Congress enacted S 365(d)(3) for the purpose of altering 
a pre-Code practice that had created a problem for 
landlords of non-residential property and that our task is to 
determine the nature of the change based on the text 
chosen. Finally, we acknowledge that the result we reach 
may in some cases leave room for strategic behavior on the 
part of landlords and tenants. Here, we tender only two 
observations. Tax reimbursement obligations are only a 
small constellation in the universe of obligations coming 
within the scope of S 365(d)(3), and there is no basis in the 
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text for distinguishing them from rent and numerous other 
obligations of tenants. Moreover, strategic behavior even in 
the area of tax reimbursement can be constrained by 
forethought and careful drafting. 
 
Contrary to the suggestion of Montgomery Ward, we do 
not find our decision in In re Columbia Gas Transmission 
Corp., 37 F.3d 982 (3d Cir. 1994), to be helpful in resolving 
the issue before us. As Montgomery Ward stresses, we 
there observed that a tax liability is generally"incurred on 
the date it accrues, not on the date of the assessment or 
date on which it is payable." Id. at 985. Columbia Gas did 
not involve a lease, however, and, accordingly, did not call 




Montgomery Ward's lease obligation to reimburse 
CenterPoint for tax payments arose post-order and prior to 
rejection. Under S 365(d)(3), Montgomery Ward's obligation 
must be fulfilled not in part, but in full. 
 
The judgment of the District Court will be reversed and 
this case will be remanded for proceedings consistent with 
this opinion. 
 
                                11 
 
 




This appeal requires us to determine when a leasehold 
obligation "arises" for purposes of S 365(d)(3) of the 
Bankruptcy Code. The majority holds, in effect, that an 
obligation that accrues over time does not arise as it 
accrues, but instead arises at whatever time the parties 
specify in their lease. Because I believe that the majority's 
holding gives an unwarranted preference to landlords for 




Section 365(d)(3) provides, in pertinent part, that: 
 
       The trustee shall timely perform all the obligations of 
       the debtor . . . arising from and after the order for relief 
       under any unexpired lease of nonresidential real 
       property, until such lease is assumed or rejected, 
       notwithstanding section 503(b)(1) of this title. 
 
11 U.S.C. S 365(d)(1). The plain import of this provision is 
that the trustee must fulfill all obligations under the lease 
which "arise" from the date of the order until the date of 
assumption or rejection.1 
 
In the present case, the lease called for reimbursement of 
taxes when invoiced by the landlord. Shortly after the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. I do not perceive a "syntactical ambiguity" in the statute. Unlike the 
majority, I read the phrase "from and after" as a redundant pair, much 
like the common phrases "over and above" or"cease and desist". Hence, 
I believe that "from" is used in the sense of"commencing with", and 
modifies the order rather than the lease: The statute deals with 
obligations under the lease, arising "from and after" the date of the 
order. Although the majority's alteration of the syntax through insertion 
of commas may resolve the majority's perceived difficulty with the usage 
of "from", it creates a new usage problem by designating the order for 
relief (or perhaps the relief itself) to be "under" the lease. In any 
event, 
it appears that these disagreements over the parsing of the statutory text 
are of merely academic concern, as I believe that the majority agrees that 
the trustee need not perform obligations that arise before the date of the 
order. 
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tenant filed for bankruptcy protection in July, 1997, the 
landlord issued invoices for taxes attributable to all of 1996 
and 1997, up to the September 1, 1997 expiration date of 
the lease. The majority today holds that, because the billing 
took place within the eight-week administrative period 
between entry of an order for relief and expiration of the 
lease (before assumption or rejection thereof), the entire 
twenty months' worth of tax obligations "arose" during that 
eight-week period. In so holding, the majority elevates the 
accident or artifice of the billing date above the economic 
reality of the accrual, and thereby inappropriately burdens 
the administration of the bankrupt estate and unfairly 
favors landlords over similarly situated pre-petition 
creditors. 
 
The majority's holding is predicated on its view that the 
"fundamental tenet" of S 365(d)(3) is that "it is the terms of 
the lease that determine the obligation and when it arose". 
Supra at 7. While I agree that the terms of the lease 
determine the obligation, the statute says nothing about 
how to determine when the obligation arises. Nothing in the 
text is inconsistent with the common-sense view that when 
an obligation arises may be fixed by its intrinsic nature 
and/or by the extrinsic circumstances of its accrual. An 
obligation attributable to a particular time may well be said 
to "arise" at that time, and an obligation that accrues over 
time may be said to "arise" as it accrues, without doing 
violence to the statutory language. 
 
I believe that the true "fundamental tenet" ofS 365(d)(3) 
is that landlords, like other post-petition creditors, should 
receive full and timely payment for post-petition services. 
This is in keeping with the policy of the Bankruptcy Code 
of giving priority to post-petition claims to enable the debtor 
to keep operating for as long as its current revenues cover 
current costs (so that the debtor's business is yielding a net 
economic benefit). See In re Handy Andy Home 
Improvement Centers, Inc., 144 F.3d 1125, 1127 (7th Cir. 
1998). Moreover, S 365(d)(3) should be read in light of the 
overarching policy of treating all creditors within a class 
(such as unsecured pre-petition trade creditors) alike. Both 
of these policies are disserved by requiring the debtor or 
trustee to repay back taxes, a pre-petition "sunk cost", as 
a condition of ongoing operations. See id. at 1128. 
 
                                13 
 
 
Our decision today creates a split of authority among the 
Courts of Appeals concerning priority of back taxes that are 
billed post-petition, as it is squarely in conflict with the 
Seventh Circuit's well-reasoned decision in Handy Andy. As 
Chief Judge Posner explained: 
 
       The quarrel between the parties is over whether 
       [tenant]'s "obligation" under the lease could arise 
       before [tenant] was contractually obligated to 
       reimburse [landlord] for the taxes that the latter had 
       paid. . . . [the] `billing date' approach is a possible 
       reading of section 365(d)(3), but it is neither inevitable 
       nor sensible. It is true that [tenant]'s obligation to 
       [landlord] to pay (or reimburse [landlord] for paying) 
       the real estate taxes did not crystallize until the rental 
       due date after the taxes were paid. But since death and 
       taxes are inevitable and [tenant]'s obligation under the 
       lease to pay the taxes was clear, that obligation could 
       realistically be said to have arisen piecemeal every day 
       of 1994 and to have become fixed irrevocably when, the 
       last day of the year having come and gone, the lease 
       was still in force. Had the lease been terminated for 
       one reason or another on January 1, 1995, [tenant] 
       would have had a definite obligation to reimburse 
       [landlord] for the 1994 real estate taxes when those 
       taxes were billed to [landlord]. The obligation thus 
       arose, in a perfectly good sense, before the bankruptcy. 
       The obligation to reimburse [landlord] for the first 
       installment of the 1995 taxes likewise arose before the 
       bankruptcy. 
 
Handy Andy, 144 F.3d at 1127. I find this reasoning 
persuasive, and I would follow it in this case. 
 
The majority finds support for its position in a recent 
decision by the Sixth Circuit that involved just one month 
of advance rent rather than a year and a half of back taxes. 
See In re Koenig Sporting Goods, Inc., 203 F.3d 986 (6th 
Cir. 2000). Although I disagree with the statutory analysis 
in Koenig Sporting Goods, it would seem that parceling a 
continuing obligation into monthly increments is far less 
subversive of statutory policies than aggregating a year or 
more of accrued debt for priority purposes. In any event, 
the Sixth Circuit itself apparently considers the difference 
 
                                14 
 
 
between a short advance payment and a long back payment 
to be important. Compare Vause v. Capital Poly Bag, Inc., 
886 F.2d 794 (6th Cir. 1989) (rejecting argument that farm 
rent payable at end of year accrued only on the payment 
date) with Koening Sporting Goods, 203 F.3d at 990 nn.4&5 
(distinguishing Vause as involving rent payments in arrears 
rather than in advance). 
 
Although some courts have applied the "billing date" 
approach adopted by the majority today, most decisions 
have rejected that approach in favor of proration. See, e.g., 
In re McCrory Corp., 210 B.R. 934, 940 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) 
(observing that the billing date approach "would result in a 
windfall either to the landlord or the debtor-tenant"); In re 
Victory Markets, Inc., 196 B.R. 6 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y. 1996); In 
re All For A Dollar, Inc., 174 B.R. 358 (Bankr. D. Mass. 
1994); In re Child World, Inc., 161 B.R. 571 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) 
(observing that allowing landlords to recover for pre-petition 
services billed post-petition "would grant landlords a 
windfall payment, to the detriment of other creditors"); In re 
Ames Department Stores, 150 B.R. 107 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 
1993). Cf. Daugherty v. Kenerco Leasing Co. (In re Swanton 
Corp.), 584 B.R. 474 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (rent prorated 
although lease called for yearly rental payments). 2 
 
The proration approach is in keeping with what had 
been, prior to enactment of S 365(d)(3), the well-established 
rule. See, e.g., Child World, 161 B.R. at 575-76 (referring to 
"the long-standing practice under S 503(b)(1) of prorating 
debtor-tenant's rent to cover only the postpetition, 
prerejection period, regardless of billing date"). As the 
majority acknowledges, we should not read legislation to 
alter established bankruptcy practice "absent a clear 
indication that Congress intended such a departure." Supra 
at 10, quoting Pennsylvania Dept. Pub. Welfare v. 
Davenport, 495 U.S. 552, 563 (1990). See also Cohen v. De 
La Cruz, 523 U.S. 213 (1998) (same); Midlantic Nat'l Bank 
v. New Jersey Dep't of Envtl. Protection, 474 U.S. 494, 501 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. See generally 2 Norton Bank. L. & Prac. 2d S 42:8 Nonresidental Real 
Property Leases under Code S 365(D)(3) (2000 Supp.); Arnold M. 
Quittner, Executory Contracts and Leases, 805 PLI/Comm 79, 249-53 
(April 2000). 
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(1986) ("The normal rule of statutory construction is that if 
Congress intends for legislation to change the interpretation 
of a judicially created concept, it makes the intent specific. 
The court has followed this rule with particular care in 
construing the scope of bankruptcy codifications."). 
 
Although, as the majority suggests, Congress clearly 
intended to change prior practice when it enacted 
S 365(d)(3), I can find no indication of a specific intent to 
displace proration with the billing date approach. Rather, it 
seems clear that the statute was aimed at providing 
landlords with current pay for current services and 
relieving them from the "actual and necessary" analysis 
required under S 503(b)(1). Nothing in the text or legislative 
history suggests that Congress wished to go beyond putting 
landlords on the same footing with other trade creditors by 
allowing them through the timing of their billing to 
transform pre-petition claims into post-petition claims. See 
Handy Andy, 144 F.3d at 1128; Child World  at 575-76. 
 
The majority seeks to marshal support for its 
interpretation from the remarks of Senator Hatch in the 
legislative history. However, the Senator's observation that 
the trustee must perform "all the obligations . .. at the time 
required in the lease" simply has no bearing on the 
question before us. The quoted passage merely indicates 
when an obligation must be performed: "at the time 
required in the lease", which adds nothing to the statute's 
requirement of "timely" performance. It simply does not 




Because neither the language of the statute nor the 
legislative history forecloses the District Court's common- 
sense interpretation - one that preserves prior practice and 
better serves fundamental bankruptcy policies, I would 
affirm the decision below. Accordingly, I dissent. 
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